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Introducing heterogeneity of beliefs across diﬀerent agents builds a link between wealth
distribution and the equity premium. We demonstrate that an economy populated only by
risk neutral agents may nonetheless display a strictly positive equity premium.
We then place our notion of belief heterogeneity within the popular representative agent
construct. We show that any level of belief heterogeneity in the multi agent economy can
be mapped into some speciﬁc degree of risk aversion of the representative agent economy
that keeps equilibrium prices constant. A fully dynamic model follows.
Finally, we suggest an explanation for the recent behavior of the equity premium: a
story of "heterogeneous optimism" versus "homogeneous pessimism" is presented.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D31, D51, D84, G12
Keywords: Belief Heterogeneity, Equity Premium Puzzle, Representative Agent, Risk Aver-
sion, Wealth Distribution1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper studies, in a general equilibrium framework, the role of belief heterogeneity in
aﬀecting ﬁnancial asset pricing and its interaction with the distribution of wealth. This
exercise not only contributes to the explanation of the “equity premium puzzle” (Mehra
and Prescott (1985)) but also provides a novel interpretation of the temporal evolution of
the premium in the last decade.
We will show how an economy populated only by risk neutral agents can nevertheless
display a strictly positive equity premium, i.e. the diﬀerence between the rate of return
of stocks and bonds. The extent of the premium will depend on the initial distribution
of wealth, once we allow for heterogeneity of beliefs about the future among agents with
otherwise identical preferences. It is worthy to highlight that, in general, belief heterogeneity
aﬀects the equity premium: even perfectly symmetric divergence of individual beliefs matter.
In fact, in equilibrium, the equity premium is always determined as a weighted mean of
individual beliefs: the weights are fundamentally determined by the relative share of wealth
that each group sharing the same beliefs has. This is why the equity premium results as
the interaction of belief heterogeneity and wealth distribution: without belief heterogeneity,
wealth distribution does not matter1; with egalitarian distribution of wealth, only the beliefs
of the average agent matters and thus heterogeneity, by itself, can not aﬀect the equity
premium. In general though, the only case in which a change in belief heterogeneity does
not aﬀect the equity premium is when this change exactly matches the distribution of
wealth in the economy. But this clearly is a measure zero event so - we conclude - belief
heterogeneity generically aﬀects the equity premium2. These considerations will become
transparent after section 3.
We will then reconcile heterogeneity of beliefs in a multi individual economy with the
representative agent framework. We argue that, in the standard exercises, a representative
agent’s risk aversion simultaneously embodies two things: an economy wide measure of risk
aversion and the level of belief heterogeneity present in the economy. We prove that any
level of belief heterogeneity may be mapped into a particular degree of risk aversion for the
corresponding representative agent economy.
We subsequently introduce a fully dynamic version of the model that connects our story
to the standard consumption asset pricing model of Lucas [1978]. This inﬁnite horizon
economy delivers two interesting features. First, it endogenizes the duration of belief het-
erogeneity. Secondly, it allows the study of its cumulative eﬀects along a possibly long
(though ﬁnite) sequence of periods. Finally, we apply the theoretical interpretation pro-
vided above to analyze the temporal evolution of the equity premium in the last decade.
We present some evidence supporting the view that a particularly high degree of belief
heterogeneity was present in the economy at that time. Consistently with our theoretical
results, we also provide a possible explanation of the recent evolution of the premium over
time.
Within the wide range of models from which the “equity premium puzzle” emerged, it
1Assume throughout that individuals have identical utility function.
2Notice that our results do not require the assumption of short-sales constraints as in Miller [1977].
1is recognized that stocks are not “suﬃciently” risky to pay the premium that is actually
observed. In other words: if the degree of risk aversion coming from micro data is reliable,
the empirical diﬀerence in returns between stocks and bonds is too large compared to what
can be explained through agent’s risk aversion; equivalently, the consumption path of the
representative agent is too smooth given the “low” return risk characteristic of the market
portfolio of stocks.
Kocherlakota [1996] argues that there are three theoretically crucial assumptions on
which the puzzle depends: (a) standard Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) pref-
erences, (b) complete capital markets and (c) costless trading. The research relaxing the
complete market assumption and the frictionless trade hypothesis [e.g. Aiyagari and Gertler,
1991; Telmer, 1993; Heaton and Lucas, 1996 and 1997)] has not seemed to provide sub-
stantial advancements in understanding the puzzle. We will argue that a simple application
of the Arrow-Debreu framework can illustrate an alternative theoretical explanation of the
“equity premium puzzle” that discusses only the underlying assumption of this class of mod-
els: the representative agent. The following exercise can thus be interpreted as an attempt
to depart from the representative agent framework so as to isolate what heterogeneity in
beliefs across agents really adds.
In order to keep the analysis as general as possible - but without useless complications
- we start by employing a general equilibrium framework with two agents, two periods,
two assets and one commodity. This choice is inspired by recent application of general
equilibrium theory3. This setup has the beneﬁt of clearly highlighting the completeness
of the asset structure in a frictionless environment. In section 7, we extend the initial
results to the inﬁnite horizon economy and ﬁnd that most results carry over despite minor
complications.
A good deal of literature has focused, more or less directly, on the eﬀects of various kinds
of heterogeneity on asset prices. Using a closely similar framework to the one employed here,
an important part of this literature has studied the eﬀect of heterogeneous endowments on
equilibrium pricing. They tipically assume that, with some positive probability, agents may
face reduced (or zero) labor income. The consequences in terms of representative agent
representation and aggregate ﬂuctuations have been studied at least since Constantinides
[1982], Constantinides and Duﬃe [1996] and Krusell and Smith [1995].
Although the studies abovementioned have provided an interesting branch of research,
the empirical evidence for the US points out that only relatively few economic agents are
“stockholders”. Though this group has been steadily increasing since the Fifties, the 1998
“Survey of Consumer Finances” still reports that 95 % of stocks are owned by the top 10% of
stock owners4. This evidence suggests what will be the central point of this paper: the study
of equilibrium asset pricing should focus more on heterogeneity that is not income related.
The recent shift in the literature toward preference heterogeneity - and belief heterogeneity
in particular - as a determinant of equilibrium asset pricing may be interpreted to be
3In particular, Geanakoplos [2002].
4Guvenen [2002] reports that even if “the stockholding rate has reached almost 50 percent in 1999”,
“a signiﬁcant fraction of households are holding very small amounts of stocks. In the 1984 PSID data, 24
percent of households declare themselves as stock owners whereas the fraction holding more than $10,000
worth of stocks is less than 10 percent (Mankiw and Zeldes 1991)”. [p.10, ibid]
2consequence of this evidence.
Various attempts employ a continuous time framework. Ziegler [2001] and Berrada
[2003] focus on the statistical property of asset pricing when agents are assumed to have
heterogeneous understanding about the dividend process underlying the economy. Wang
[1995], Chan et al [2002], and Dumas [1987] consider speciﬁc examples with heterogeneous
degrees of risk aversion. Their conclusions, though interesting to our purpose, are aﬀected
by the assumed functional forms. Moreover it is not immediate to reconcile them with
the traditional discrete time framework so widely used in macroeconomics. Always in
continuous time, Duﬃe et al. [2001] study the eﬀect of belief heterogeneity on asset pricing
when shorting of lended securities is possible. In their framework, as in ours, the rationale
for trading is provided by heterogenous belief across diﬀerent agents. They focus on the
determination and evolution of prices when lending fees arise. One of the basic insights of our
study, perhaps more macroeconomic oriented, is also to link heterogeneity in a multiagent
economy with the representative agent framework.
Guvenen [2002] integrates preference heterogeneity in the standard dynamic program-
ming framework to replicate the main ﬁnancial and macroeconomic stylized facts. His
results require a substantial heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
across agents and limited participation in the stock market. Unfortunately, although Gu-
venen’s interesting results do not allow us to isolate the eﬀect of preference heterogeneity
and, in particular, belief heterogeneity. This is, as we argued, the important exercise that
we will undertake in the present study.
An outline of the paper is as follows: section 2 introduces the general framework of
analysis and analyzes the no arbitrage condition which must be satisﬁed in equilibrium.
In section 3 we show that heterogeneity in beliefs establishes the relationship between eq-
uity premium and wealth distribution and we generalize it to a strictly concave economy.
Section 4 reconciles our notion of heterogeneity of beliefs with the popular representative
agent representation. Section 5 extends the static model to the traditional inﬁnite horizon
Lucas (1978) model and provides an interpretation about the recent behavior of the equity
premium. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Simple General Equilibrium Model
2.1 Setup
Our initial framework of analysis is an Arrow-Debreu economy with production. For sim-
plicity of exposition, we assume an economy composed of two agents (L,M) and two periods:
today and tomorrow. Today (t =0 ) individual endowments are revealed and the agents
choose which assets to buy in order to provide consumption for themselves in the future.
Tomorrow (t =1 ) stochastic production takes place: in each of two contingengies (s =1 ,2)
the (contingent) total production is distributed to each individual according to the share of
property rights (stocks) he holds. There is also available a riskless asset, in zero net supply,
that pays one unit of the consumption good in both contingencies.
At t =0agents (L,M) are endowed only with fractions of the perfectly divisible claim
3to total output, thus this asset entitles the owner to a share of total production tomorrow.





i =1 . Individuals then decide
how to allocate their wealth for future consumption: they can exchange property rights over
the production technology (i.e. zi) and/or trade the riskless asset bi.A s s e tp a y o ﬀsa r et h e
only source of income in both contingencies s =1 ,2 at t =1 .
To summarize, only two kinds of asset can be traded between at t =0 ,as t o c kzi,
i = L,M where
P
i=L,M zi =1 , which entitles the holder to a share of production at t =1
and a bond bi,
P
i=L,M bi =0that guarantees 1 unit of the consumption good in both
contingencies. Choosing a portfolio at t =0implies therefore some uncertainty. The asset
payoﬀ are as follows:
⎡
⎣
Boom (s =1 ) Recession (s =2 )
bond b 11
stock zd B = Bd R = R
⎤
⎦;B>R>1
M and L diﬀer in their behavior in only one way: they have diﬀerent priors used to
maximize expected utility. Following Savage [1954] interpretation, we will view priors as an
assessment about the future that can be “extracted” from the individual’s preference order.








(1 − ρ) if s =2
;π>ρ ;π>(1/2)
Therefore, the expected returns of z and b must bear the following relationship to one
another5:
EPM(b)=EPL(b)=1<E PM(z)=ρB +( 1− ρ)R<E PL(z)=πB +( 1− π)R.






pzzi + pbbi ≤ pzz0
i at t =0
cs
L ≤ ds · zi + bi at s =1 ,2
(1)
ds = payoﬀ of z,c s
i ≥ 0,i ∈ (M,L)
We seek an explanation of the equity premium that abstracts from risk aversion. There-
fore we assume a linear utility function, i.e. Ui(cs)=cs
i,i∈ (M,L), for both agents in
order to focus on belief heterogeneity alone as a determinant of the equity premium.
2.2 The No Arbitrage Condition: Asset Prices and Technology
Since equilibrium prices must not create arbitrage opportunities for any agent, the no
arbitrage condition can be used to determine the interval in which equilibrium asset prices
5The second strict inequality is the result of our assumption on (PL,P M).
6We abstract from consumption at t =0to avoid complications.
4lie. No Arbitrage implies that there is no portfolio giving strictly positive payoﬀ in one
state (and at least zero in all the others) at zero cost.F o r m a l l y :
[No Arbitrage] In equilibrium, there is no portfolio (z,b) available to any individual such
that: pzz + pbb =0and ds · z + b ≥ 0,with strict inequality for some s.
Before stating the consequences of the condition above, we must make a crucial ob-
servation. Since L,M have diﬀerent beliefs about the future, the ﬁnal portfolio allocation
depends on the diﬀerence between the prior of M and the prior of L. In fact, by assumption,
EPM(z) <E PL(z). Thus, since utility functions are linear, the highest price that L and M,
respectively, are willing to pay for purchasing the risky asset is diﬀerent. In particular, the
subjective limit price (¯ pi
z = EPi(z),i∈ (L,M))a r es u c ht h a t¯ pL
z > ¯ pM
z .T h e r e f o r e :
Proposition 1 If beliefs are heterogeneous across agents, in equilibrium, M (L) goes short
(long) in stocks and long (short) in bonds, i.e. zM < 0 and zL > 0 (bM > 0 and bL < 0).
The proof is immediate. It is only worthwhile to highlight that going short on the risky
asset implies going long on the bond because of the non negativity constraint on t =1
consumption. To determine the interval in which equilibrium asset prices must lie, we
argue by contradiction. If an arbitrage portfolio (zA,b A) were to exist, the following must
simultaneously hold:
ds · zA + bA ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ bA ≥− ds · zA with strict inequality for some s;





≤ pzzA + pbbA =0with strict inequality for some s
Since no arbitrage has to hold for both individuals we have:






pb ≥ ds,∀s ∈ {1,2} =⇒
pz
pb ≥ max
s ds = B






pb ≤ ds,∀s ∈ {1,2} =⇒
pz
pb ≤ min
s ds = R
Therefore the equilibrium (relative) price is bounded by the payoﬀs of the production
technology:




s ds = B
3 The Relation between the Equity Premium and the Dis-
tribution of Wealth in Equilibrium
3.1 The Linear Economy
We will now compute the equilibrium. This computation will deliver the relation between
the equity premium and the distribution of wealth when belief heterogeneity is present. An
equilibrium (Υi,z0











s;s =1 ,2 (4)
(bi,z i) ∈ argmaxΥi,i∈ (M,L) (5)
At given equilibrium price, agents maximize utility under their budget constraints -
in particular, consumptions tomorrow must be non negative for both L and M -a n da l l
markets clear.
Since what matters is the relative price of stocks and bonds, it does no harm to normalize
the price of the bond, i.e. pb = EM(b)=EL(b)=1 . With this normalization, the
equilibrium (relative) price of the risky asset lies between the two subjective limit prices,
¯ pi
z
7,i∈ (M,L), ¯ pM
z < ¯ pL
z .O t h e r w i s e ,i fpz < ¯ pM
z , both agents would purchase stocks and an
excess demand for the risky asset z would appear. If, instead, pz > ¯ pL
z , all the individuals
would sell stocks and an excess supply would appear. One should keep in mind that the
subjective limit price is the price that makes one agent indiﬀerent between holding or selling
an asset.
With the equilibrium price pz ∈
£
¯ pM
z , ¯ pL
z
¤
, M ﬁnds rewarding to sell z (at least he is
indiﬀerent). pz is so high from M’s point of view that he sells all his ﬁnancial endowment,
z0
M, going even short on z and he purchases as many bonds as possible with the proceeds.
An opposite reasoning holds for L.S i n c e M goes short on the risky asset and default is
not allowed in any contingency, M must purchase bonds, b,f r o mL. At the same time and
for opposite reasons, L is willing to buy as much z as he can, selling bonds. But L also
has to be sure that he will not default in any state, in particular in the recession (s =2 )
when what he gets from the risky asset is low and what he has to pay to the bond holder
is relatively high.




as much as he can, he will eventually hit the nonnegativity constraint on consumption in
the boom (s =1 ) . M’s optimization will thus deliver cB
M =0 , i.e. M’s consumption at
s =1is null. By an opposite reasoning L will hit the constraint at s =2and so cR
L =0 :
c2
L =0 ,(RECESSION) ⇔ R · zL + bL =0⇔ bL = −R · zL < 0 (6)
c1
M =0 ,(BOOM) ⇔ B · zM + bM =0⇔ bM = −B · zM > 0 (7)
Equations (2), (3), (6), (7) are a linear system of four equations in four unknowns whose
solution is:
bM = RB
B−R > 0; bL = RB
R−B < 0 (8)
7Deﬁned in the previous section.
6zM = R
R−B < 0; zL = B
B−R > 0 (9)
Plugging these results in L’s budget constraint at t =0and recalling that the bond















(10) shows the relation between wealth distribution and asset pricing. It is immediate to
observe that an higher share of wealth of the optimistic individual L translates into higher
stock price pz.
In Proposition 2 we argued that, at equilibrium prices, M goes short and L goes long




z = EPM(z), ¯ pL
z = EPL(z)
¤
,w h e r e¯ pi
z, i ∈ (M,L), are the subjective limit prices.
A ta n yp r i c ei nt h eo p e ni n t e r v a l ,M goes short in stocks and long in bonds while L does
exactly the opposite. At ¯ pM
z , M is indiﬀerent between buying or selling the risky asset but
L strictly prefers to buy it. At ¯ pL
z the reverse is true: L is indiﬀerent but M wants to
sell z as much as he can. This argument shows that any pz ∈
£
¯ pM




equilibrium allocations [equations (8), (9)].
To summarize, wealth distribution maps into equilibrium price as follows (Figure 1):
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣




































No Equilibrium pz < ¯ pM
z
⎤




















































, the equilibrium price pz ∈
£
¯ pM
z , ¯ pL
z
¤
and is increasing the richer L gets. The discussion above applies: L goes long in stocks and
short in bonds and M does the opposite since the equilibrium price is determined according
to (10).






) the price is constrained at the lower
bound of the interval, ¯ pM
z . Even though the lack of resources of L, the stock buyer, tends
to push the price of the risky asset down, market equilibrium considerations prevent the
price from falling further. L will then adjust his portfolio since the amount of risky asset he
can aﬀord has now decreased. Notice that, because of the change in L’s portfolio when his
wealth is particularly low, L’s and M’s consumption will adjust (in particular L will decrease
7consumption in contingency 1 and M will have positive consumption in both contingencies).
Since at ¯ pM
z M is indiﬀerent between selling or holding z, any portfolio allocation that







would now push up pz but the market equilibrium locks the price at ¯ pL
z .T h e o p t i m a l
portfolio allocation would change in an opposite fashion to the previous case and so we will
not repeat the reasoning. We therefore conclude that any level of wealth maps into some
asset prices.
Deﬁning the equity premium as the diﬀerence between the rates of return of the risky
and the riskless asset, we have:










We already observed, by (10), that the price of stocks, pz, is monotonically increasing
in L’s share of ﬁnancial wealth, zL
0 . Since the price of bond is normalized to 1, we can now
relate the distribution of wealth to the risk premium: the premium depends inversely on
the price of the risky asset which, in turn, is positively correlated with the L’s initial share
of ﬁnancial wealth.
Since diﬀerent agents have diﬀerent beliefs about the future, the expected value of
asset payoﬀs is subjective. When we wrote the expression for the equity premium, we
used the expected payoﬀ of stocks according to the beliefs of L, the only stockholder in
equilibrium. However, we could have assumed that the expected payoﬀ of stock had to be
computed with respect to the probability assessment of M, the pessimistic agent holding
zero stock in equilibrium. In that case, a strictly negative equity premium would have
resulted, though still depending on the wealth distribution. Our assumption is due to the
desire of highlighting the relevance of belief heterogeneity in addressing the equity premium
puzzle. But the central point always holds: with belief heterogeneity the wealth distribution
aﬀects the equity premium.
In general, two interpretations of the equity premium can be raised to justify the way we
describe it. Firstly, we can view it as the subjective equity premium, i.e. the equity premium
computed respect to the beliefs of the stockholder. This agent is, needless to say, the most
optimistic individual: he assigns the highest expected value to the risky asset. Since it
is certainly diﬃcult to assume that each agent knows the actual distribution of relevant
stochastic events, this interpretation could be seen as a way to convey some realism in
the model. The main result here is the relation between asset pricing and distribution:
agents’ disagreement about the future is the linking mechanism. The drawback of this
interpretation is the diﬃculty in assessing our story through empirical evidence.
An alternative interpretation is that we have described an economy in which some agents
in the economy are pessimisticly wrong about the future. If this fraction of the population
has positive wealth, stock prices will move down accordingly. Then the equity premium will
tend to increase. More importantly, even if the large majority of agents knows the actual
distribution of dividends in the future and is never wrong about its structure, mistakes by
a small part of the population can still deliver a strictly positive equity premium in risk
neutral environment. One could identify this kind of equity premium as an “heterogeneity
8premium”8.
In either of these cases, however, a complete mapping between wealth distribution and
the equity premium is established. To summarize:
Proposition 2 (Wealth and Asset Pricing) Given the level of belief heterogeneity in a
risk neutral economy, the higher is the ﬁnancial wealth of the most optimistic individual,
zL
0 , the higher is the relative price of stock and the lower the equity premium. Moreover this
relationship is monotonic.
The intuition is straightforward: if everyone is optimistic in the economy (L type), there
is nothing to be rewarded for buying the risky asset. Vice versa, the higher the proportion
of pessimistic investors (M type) the higher the risk premium guaranteed to the (optimistic)
buyer of the risky asset will be. Notice ﬁnally that there is only one price at which the
equity premium is zero: ¯ pL
z .
3.2 The Strictly Concave Economy9
The relationship between ﬁnancial wealth and the equity premium is by no means dependent
on the assumption of linear utility. In this section we will restate our theory in an environ-
ment where agents possess diﬀerentiable, strictly concave (Ui
c() > 0,Ui
cc() < 0,i = L,M)
utilities which satisfy the following:
[Weak Inada] Let x and y be two consumption vectors, x> >0 and yc =0for some
consumption good c,t h e nUi(x) >U i(y),i= L,M.
In every other respect we consider an economy equivalent to the original. Since in
equilibrium all agents optimize, we start from the individual maximization problems ΥL and
ΥM -d e ﬁn e di n( 1 )-w i t hs t r i c t l yc o n c a v eu t i l i t ya n dC o n d i t i o n4 holding. Equivalently




























8Abel [2000] already shows that “uniform pessimism and doubt both increase the average equity premium”
(p.2) in a representativa agent economy. Here we point out that the discussion should include another
factor. The pessimism of a small fraction of the population is necessary but not suﬃcient to generate a
strictly positive equity premium. In fact, given belief heterogeneity, the premium is determined by wealth
distribution, as the proposition states.
9See appendix for details regarding this section.












By Condition 4, consumption is strictly positive in both periods and so the lagrange
multipliers on the nonegativity constraints are equal to zero. Therefore, in equilibrium,














Equating the marginal rate of substitution for both agents we have:


















































Using the budget constraint at t =0to express z as a function of b and equilibrium











to the price of stock (pZ). Since our ultimate objective is to get a
relation between the two quantities, we apply the Implicit Function Theorem. In order to do





only because there are two endogeneous variables in








































: R2 × R −→ R2







< 0 if is zL




(15) conﬁrms the existence of a relation between the share of ﬁnancial wealth of L and
the stock price, i.e. between wealth distribution and asset pricing. To summarize:
10Proposition 3 (Wealth and Asset Pricing, Strictly Concave Economy) In strictly
concave economies the relation between wealth distribution and asset pricing is not monotonic.
Under our restrictions: when the share of ﬁnancial wealth, zL
0 , of the most optimistic in-





,then the income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect
and the relative price of stocks is increasing in his wealth; when the share of ﬁnancial wealth,
zL





, then the substitution eﬀect
dominates and the relative price of stocks is decreasing in his wealth.
This result has an intuitive explanation: for a relatively low share of wealth for L,t h e
richer he becomes, the more the relative price of stock will tend to increase. Then, once L’s
wealth increases above a certain threshold, the substitution eﬀect between consumption in
the boom and recession will start to dominate the income eﬀect. This will make L willing
to get a more balanced consumption across contingencies and he will then want to sell some
of his endoment of stock to purchase bonds. Therefore, in order for the market equilibrium
to emerge,
pz
pb will have to fall.
The considerations above - though subject to some restrictions regarding the size of some
second derivatives - suggest that, in the case of an economy where agents have some degree
of risk aversion, there will be a particular wealth distribution that, maximizing the relative
price of stock over bond, will minimize the equity premium. This result, achieved under
fairly general condition, probably deserves some empirical attention. In conclusion, if the
assumption of belief heterogeneity is plausible11, then studying the equity premium should
not abstract from distributional consideration in both linear and strict concave economies.
4 Mapping Belief Heterogeneity into Risk Aversion
In this section we relate the previous discussion to the representative agent framework. We
discuss the way its risk aversion is interpreted in the standard exercises and argue that this
interpretation implicitly embodies belief heterogeneity.
We deﬁne two strictly concave economies: a multi agent economy E1 and a representative
agent economy E2. There are 2 periods (today (t =0 ) and tomorrow (t =1 )) with
S contingencies (s = {1,...,S}), resolved between the ﬁrst and the second period. We
will study the conditions under which these economies deliver market equilibria that are
equivalent in terms of pricing.














s at t =0
u : RS → R,twice diﬀerentiable




πh(s)=1 , a probability measure.
11Maybe option prices (e.g. the call premium on the S&P 500 portfolio) may provide an instrument to
measure belief heterogeneity in the equity market.
11We will denote this economy as E1 =[ ( uh = u,eh)h∈{1,...,H}] where eh,c h ∈ RS.














s at t =0







Aggregate endowments is thus the same in both economies, contingency per contingency.
For brevity, we will denote the second economy with E2 =[ ( uRA = u,eRA)].
In both economies agents purchase at t =0t h ec o n t i n g e n tc o m m o d i t yf o re v e r yc o n t i n -
gency s = {1,...,S}. Thus, the number of contingent commodities is S.
Deﬁnition 1 A Market Equilibrium (ME) for our economies is deﬁned by a price vector

























s) ∈ argmaxUi,i ∈ (h ∈ {1,...,H} or RA)















The condition above is the standard equality between the marginal rate of substitution













An equilibrium always exists and, by our assumptions on preferences (strict monotonicity
is implied), every agent consumes all his endowment (in monetary terms).
We consider a simple exercise. We compare equilibria in E1 (the multi agent economy)
and equilibria in E2 (the representative agent economy) in an attempt to map belief het-
erogeneity of the ﬁrst economy into risk aversion of the representative agent in the second
one. In particular, we study what happens to the representative agent risk aversion when
belief heterogeneity arises in the multi agent economy if we want the two economies to be
equivalent in pricing terms. Thus:
Deﬁnition 2 We deﬁne two economies to be price-equivalent (PE) if they have the same
ME price.
Firstly, we observe:
12Proposition 4 When one individual, h, changes the prior relevant for his consumption
decisions, ME prices adjust, given the initial allocation of endowment.
Proof. [Proof of Proposition 8] Assume, by contradiction, that ME prices do not move
when h changes her probabilty assessment about the future s.t. πh(s) increases and πh(s0)

















which breaks the optimality of ch for h.T h e r e f o r eh’s equilibrium consumption must move.










the change in ch implies the change in ch0
for some h0 6= h. But this implies that ME prices must move: contradiction.
Secondly, we consider that equilibrium in E2 implies the following:
Remark 1 In E2 economies, ME consumption for the representative agent must match the
aggregate endowment in each contingency, i.e. cRA
s = eRA
s , ∀s.
We can discuss the relation between belief heterogeneity in the multiagent economy
and the risk aversion of the representative agent. In order to make our case clearer, we
consider economies with only two contingencies (S =2 ) and only two agents in E1.O u r
reasoning can be easily extended to ﬁnite contingencies (S>2) and an arbitrary number
of households (H>2).
The exercise runs as follows. Start from the situation in which E1 and E2 are PE (they
have same equilibrium prices). Assume that, for a fair comparison, the E1 and E2 are
structurally equivalent, i.e. they have the same underlying stochastic process determining
which contingency realizes tomorrow. Then at least one individual in the multi agent
economy changes his probability assessment about the future, diverging from the others.
We study what happens to ME prices in E1. Finally, we will consider how the representative
agent’s risk aversion must change so that E2 remains PE to E1.
For the sake of simplicity, we will think about contingencies tomorrow as simply Boom
(s =1 ) and Recession (s =2 ): aggregate endowment is bigger in the ﬁrst than in the second
contingency, i.e. eRA
1 >e RA
2 . For simplicity, we begin by assuming an economy where
the two individuals are identical in everything but endowments. Then we will consider
the case where their priors satisfy π1(1) >π 2(1); i.e., individual 1 believes that booms
become more likely than individual 2. In this setting it is natural to measure the degree





(e.g. a value equal to one
would correspond to perfect homogeneity). Conducting this exercise for all possible prior
movements delivers the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Assume the initial distribution of endowments is non trivial and E1 and






13accompanied by an increase (decrease) in the representative agent’s Risk Aversion in E2.12






increases. By Proposition 8 we know that if the prior of one agent changes
so do equilibrium prices. Assume, in particular, that individual 1 changes his prior while
2 stays put:
π1(1)
π2(1) increases if π1(1) raises. Then, at the original consumption bundles,
MRS1 >M R S 2 =
p1
p2. Therefore individual 1 starts moving consumption from the second
to the ﬁrst contingency. Thus, the relative price in E1 have to increase to cope with excess
demand for good 1 and excess supply for good 2. In E2, representative agent consumption can
not adjust (by Remark 9) and his prior is locked by the true stochastic process. Therefore,
E1 and E2 remain PE only if representative agent risk aversion is increased (i.e. increase





Example 1 (CRRA Utility) One of the most widely used utility functions is the Con-
stant Relative Risk Aversion type:
U(c)=
(




where γ is the measure of individual relative risk aversion. We use the same argument in
the proof above and apply it to this particular case. In fact, for the representative agent in


























We want the multiagent economy and the representative agent economy, E1 and E2 respec-
tively, to remain PE. Can a change in the risk aversion coeﬃcient (γ) of the representative
agent deliver the desired result? This is in fact the case: given any equilibrium price
p1
p2 in
E1,w em a yc h o o s eγ such that E2 is PE to E1. The following:













provides the coeﬃﬁceint of relative risk aversion that guarantees the desired result. Since
the logarithm is a monotonic function, an increase in equilibrium prices in the multiagent
economy must correspond to a higher risk aversion of an “equivalent” representative agent
economy.
The last proposition highlights the relationb e t w e e nb e l i e fh e t e r o g e n e i t yi nt h em u l t i
agent economy and risk aversion of the representative agent. If we want the two economies,
12The level of contingent production is ﬁxed in this economy and so belief heterogeneity aﬀects prices only.
In an economy where the level of production in each contingency is endogenous, also quantities would be
aﬀected by belief heterogeneity and the eﬀect on prices would be quantitatively smaller, though qualitatively
would the same.
14E1 and E2 to remain PE, an increase in belief heterogeneity fostered by optimistic (pes-
simistic) beliefs [πh(1) increases] implies an increase (decrease) in the risk aversion of the
corresponding representative agent.
In order to extend our analysis to asset pricing, we only need to observe:
Remark 2 By the Isomorphism between Debreu Economies (i.e. with markets for every
contingent commodity) and Complete Asset Market Economies, every set of equilibrium
prices in the former can be mapped into a set of equilibrium asset prices in the latter that
preserves the equilibrium allocation and viceversa.
Our argument provides therefore a novel interpretation of the risk aversion of the rep-
resentative agent. Employing the metaphor of a single individual for an entire economy
implicitly hides the role of belief heterogeneity13. In fact, in the standard simulation exer-
cise, the probabilistic assessment of the representative agent is pinned down by the empirical
time series and so can not reﬂect any disagreement between agents. Consistently with the
simulation exercise, we have compared, in terms of equilibrium pricing, agents with shifting
heterogenous beliefs with a representative agent that never changes its probability assess-
ment. But if this is right, this section suggests that the simulation of representative agent
models nests belief heterogeneity into the curvature of the utility function, a measure of risk
aversion. This may explain the poor performance of these models in replicating observed
asset pricing. To summarize:
Remark 3 Our analysis suggests the diﬃculty in assigning a measure of individual risk
aversion to the representative agent: using the representative agent as a modelling device
implies that the agent’s risk aversion captures not only individuals pure risk aversion but
also the level of belief heterogeneity in the underlying multi agent economy.
In conclusion: since the basic problem of the “equity premium puzzle” is that the risk
aversion required by standard models to match observed premia is unreasonably high, our
discussion suggests that theory may be reconciled with evidence once we can take belief
heterogeneity in full account.
5 The Dynamic Analysis
5.1 Dynamic Setup
The discussion above was intended to highlight some general matters conceptual in nature.
It remains to place them in a fully dynamic setting. This section presents a framework
that allows the study of the eﬀects of belief heterogeneity on asset pricing in an inﬁnite
horizon economy. Here we will not focus on the crucial question regarding how probability
assessments start diverging and belief heterogeneity arises.
13In general, the aggregation through the representative agent is derived assuming a continuum of agents
in the underlying economy. Our argument goes naturally through in this case: if a group of agents of non
zero measure has diﬀerent beliefs from the rest of the population, equilibrium prices take this heterogeneity
into account in the same way - qualitatively speaking - analyzed in the two agents argument.
15We start from an economy in which all agents are perfectly homogeneous in terms of
utility functions and probability assessments. We then assume that, at some point in time,
an extra contingency that was not available before arises. For simplicity, we maintain the
assumption that there are two agents in this economy. One agent is aware that the set
of possible contingencies is now enlarged while the other continues to believe that nothing
changed. The best way to picture such scenario is to think about a technological break-
through in the economy (e.g. aspirin, telephone, computer).
This is not an heroic assumption: in many relevant historical instances in which an
innovation was proposed, potential investors have disagreed about its proﬁtability. There
is a long record of successful innovations that were initially dismissed by the most impor-
tant industrial leaders14.I t i s t h e ex ante inability to detect successful innovations that
determines belief heterogeneity across investors: our modelling choice is to introduce an
additional “good” contingency about which agents are asymmetrically informed.
The structure is very similar to previous sections. There are two agents (L and M)i n
the economy who, in any period t, receive the payoﬀso ft h e i rp o r t f o l i o s ,c o n s u m et h eo n l y
commodity present in the economy and trade the two available assets, stock z and bond b,
to transfer part of their wealth to the future. In each period t one contingency s ∈ {1,...,S}
is realized. The assets payoﬀs depend upon the particular contingency that is realized and
the matrix of asset payoﬀsi sd e ﬁned as follows:
⎡
⎣
s =1 ... s = S
bond b 1 ... 1
stock zd 1 ... dS
⎤
⎦
Aggregate endowment is increasing in the label of the contingency15,i . e .s =1is the
case in which aggregate endowment - and dividend to stocks - is the lowest and s = S when
it is the highest. Since, as in Lucas (1978), we interpret the stock as a claim on aggregate
endowment, its payoﬀ is (weakly) increasing in the label of the contingency.


























cc() < 0,c t




Therefore we can cast the problem in the standard dynamic programming way:
V i
t (zt,b t;dt,p t
z,p t















14Few examples: “640K ought to be enough for anybody.” — Bill Gates, 1981, rejecting a proposal
for larger computer memory; ”Who the hell wants to copy a document on plain paper?”, 1940 Re-
jection Letter to Chester Carlson, inventor of the Xerox machine. In fact, over 20 companies re-
jected the invention between 1939 and 1944. A list presenting other striking examples can be found at
http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/reject.htm
15Note that this is a diﬀerent convention from previous sections.



















































































One must keep in mind that the Euler conditions above must hold for both individuals
at the same time, given equilibrium prices. We deﬁne:


































t (zt,b t;dt),∀t P
i=L,M bt
i =0 ,∀t P
i=L,M zt
i =1 ,∀t
For the sake of clarity, we start from the case where both individuals have the same
probability assessment, i.e. PL(s)=PM(s) ∀s,and their utility functions are identical
and homothetic17. It is then obvious to observe that asset pricing is wealth distribution
independent. Our economy is no diﬀerent, in terms of equilibrium asset pricing, from the
representative agent one.
We then study the case in which an innovation is introduced and agents are asym-
metrically informed about its consequences. In order to make matters consistent with the
discussion throughout the paper, we assume that markets are complete and remain such.
16By the usual Blackwell contraction mapping argument, V
i
t (.;.) exists since the utility function lies in
the complete space of continuous and bounded functions. Moreover V
i
t (.;.) is diﬀerentiable by Theorem 4.11
[p.85, Stokey et al., 1989].
17Notice that the CRRA utility function usually assumed in this class of consumption based asset pricing
model is homothetic.
17Since we have only two assets, this implies that the economy before innovation is made of
two contingencies, i.e. S =2 18.
When an innovation takes place, an extra contingency that was not available before
(s∗ = S +1 )becomes then possible. This has non zero probability and, if realized, it pays
oﬀ a si nt h eb e s tp o s s i b l ec a s e ,i . e .dS = dS∗. One can think about s∗ as a sunspot. This
last assumption allows us to maintain the complete market setting after the innovation is
introduced. This is important: otherwise it would be impossible to disentagle the eﬀect on
asset pricing due to the switch to incomplete markets on the one hand and the eﬀect due
to belief heterogeneity on the other.
As assumed before, agents are asymmetrically informed about the new contingency and,
in particular, we assume only L is aware of it. M still sticks to the previous probability
assessment, the one that was shared by both individuals before the innovation took place.
Naturally belief heterogeneity can not last forever. Instead of putting on M’s rationality
the strict requirement of continuous updating, we will assume that M “catches” the true
probability distribution of the economy only when the extra contingency s∗ happens. In a
sense he believes only what he sees.
We argue that this modelling choice has two major advantages:
• it renders the persistence of belief heterogeneity endogeneous. It depends on how
much time it will take for the contingency on which individuals are asymmetrically
informed to happen;
• it does not allow the agents to “agree to disagree forever”. There is a transition
in which belief heterogeneity plays a role in equilibrium asset pricing but this eﬀect
eventually disappear (with probability one) and the risk motive will be the only to be
rewarded by the equity premium.
We now study the behavior of asset pricing since an innovation is introduced in the
economy. After its introduction, L’s probability assessment changes from PL (.) to PINN
L (.),
which assign more weight to the highest dividend that stocks pay:
PINN
L (dS = dS∗)=PL(dS)+PINN
L (dS∗)
and PL (s1) >PINN
L (s1)
Given his previous optimal path of consumption the prices that L is willing to pay to
purchase stocks increases suddenly. In particular it becomes higher than the old equilibrium
prices p∗































18Notice that diﬀerent stocks could be assumed so to allow a baseline economy facing more than two
possible contingencies in each period.



















s=1, i.e. consumption is
not too unbalanced across contingencies s =1and s = S.
18where EINN
t is the expectation taken with respect to the new probability assessment, ¡
pt
z
¢Lrepresents the highest prices that L is willing to pay for stock, given the optimal
consumption stream before the innovation’s introduction.
Therefore old prices can no longer maintain the equilibrium. On the one hand, since L
now perceives the highest dividend to be more likely, stocks are particularly valuable to him.






























Since L will adjust his consumption demanding more stocks and selling bonds, the stock
price pt
z will tend to increase while the bond price pt
b will tend to decrease. Therefore the









=( RStock)t − (RBond)t
How belief heterogeneity aﬀects the equity premium in subsequent periods will depend
upon the particular sequence of contingencies, and thus stock payoﬀs, that will be realized.
For intance, if the initial distribution of wealth is egualitarian and a contingency with high
aggregate endowment is realized, L will be relatively more wealthy and stock prices will
tend to be higher. The intuition is clear nonetheless and is in line with the argument of the
previous section. Belief heterogeneity is boosted by optimistic beliefs: this was modeled here
by the fact that one agent is unaware of the actual potential of available technology and so
an higher equity premium results. Naturally the eﬀect of belief heterogeneity will disappear
once the new contingency is realized and homogeneous beliefs reappear. Eventually, the
multi agent economy, isolated from innovations, will be equivalent, in terms of asset pricing,
to the representative agent economy.
5.2 Recent Behavior of the Equity Premium:
Heterogeneous Optimism versus Homogeneous Pessimism
Building on the previous discussion, we may employ our model to suggest a plausible in-
terpretation of recent stock market behavior. We have argued that, if some agents with
positive wealth are unaware of the true potential of the available technology, equity premia
will tend to increase. This upward pressure on the equity premium takes place even if the
large majority of agents know the actual distribution of dividends in the future and is never
wrong about it. The dialectic between optimism and pessimism - implicitly hidden in a
standard representative agent framework - could be a contributing force, though not the
only one, to explain the temporal evolution of the equity premium.
While a great deal of research has attempted to provide explanations for the “unexpect-
edly”, in terms of incorporated risk, high level of the equity premium20, other empirical
20Mehra [2002] oﬀers an updated review of this literature.
19work has focused on the evolution of the equity premium over time (e.g. Blanchard [1993]
and Jagannathan et al. [2001]). We will employ our arguments to address the latter branch
of research and we will thus try to interpret the evolution of the equity premium in the
last business cycle . We will consider the period that ranges from the high equity premium
of the last economic expansion (between 1991 and 2001 [I quarter]) to the years 2001 [II
quarter]-2002 when the economy slowed down and the equity premium was substantially
reduced21.
It is a well documented fact that, historically, the realized equity premium is procyclical
in the period 1890-199122. If we restrict our attention to the last twenty years, we observe
a slightly negative correlation with the business cycle. This correlation increases sharply if
we restrict ourselves to, roughly, the last decade23. In particular, it may be observed that
the equity premium was historically high in the decade ’91-’01 and dropped in more recent
years (see Figure 2).
We focus on the following question: what could have contributed initially to such high
premium and to its subsequent drop? We will argue that the shifts in “belief heterogeneity”
may have played an important role in determining the temporal evolution of the premium.
Some casual evidence supporting our claim can be found in the IBES24 data. This
database - collecting forecasts by institutional investors about the stock market - reports,
for the Standard & Poor 500 index25, the forecasts’ standard deviation. Normalizing by
the mean of forecasts in each month, this standard deviation went up to almost 21%, in
the period ’91-’01 suggesting a signiﬁcant rise in belief heterogeneity. Though data are
lacking and we can not make comparisons with previous cycles until better instruments or
richer datasets become available, this evidence suggests that investors were, at the time,
in sizable disagreement about the stock market. It thus appears that belief heterogeneity
characterized the economy between ’91-’01. In fact, this disagreement may be considered a
speciﬁc feature of that decade, as it is argued below.
We now propose an interpretation of the shift from high equity premium in the boom to
low premium in the recession that stems from our theoretical framework. Our explanation
is based on a simple observation: the decade ’91- ’01 with historically high equity premium
was characterized by a speciﬁc kind of optimism, an heterogeneous one. Investors agreed
on the good prospects of the market but disagreed on the extent of the boom. This expec-
tational heterogeneity is not surprising if one thinks about the speciﬁc conditions of this
lasting economic upturn. Firstly, the introduction of new technologies fostered asymmetric
information giving room to diﬀerent beliefs about their proﬁtability. Secondly, the inﬂow
of foreign capital in the american ﬁnancial market has been particularly intense in the last
21These periods are selected on the basis of the NBER announcements to establish the duration of expan-
sion and contraction in the current business cycle. The beginning of this cycle is recognized in the second
quarter of 1991 and the peak of it has been identiﬁed in the ﬁrst quarter of 2001.
22Guvenen [pg.18, 2002] is a useful reference.
23Using quarterly data for GDP real growth from NIPA and the Fama French Factors we get a correlation
coeﬃcient between GDP growth and realized quarterly equity premium of -0.032 for the period that ranges
from 1980 (I) to 2002 (IV). A positive correlation of 0.36 appears if we restrict ourselves to the period from
1993 (I) to 2002 (IV).
24Institute for Business and Economic Survey
25A reasonable proxy for the market portfolio.
20decade: this may have added an extra source of expectational heterogeneity about the US
market. As a result of these factors, it may be reasonable to consider that intense belief
heterogeneity was a prevailing factor of the market at the time. In the spirit of our model,
this “optimistic” heterogeneity has to be viewed as a factor responsible in increasing the
equity premium.
By a similar but opposite reasoning we may explain the ’01-’02 market premium drop.
One could argue that the peculiarity of the recent economic slowdown has been the high
degree of homogeneity in expectations. This was the result of diﬀerent contingent factors:
a sluggish economy after a long period of outstanding economic performance and unrelated
ﬁnancial scandals have certainly been major causes of the abrupt fall in trust toward the
new economy. But this fact is particularly important for the sake of our argument: these
factors were, contrary to the past, suﬃciently persuasive and evident to induce homogeneous
perceptions and, thus, expectations. Technological innovation with uncertain potential
became therefore a less important determinant of agents expectations. The heterogeneity
connected to it did, in fact, drop.
In conclusion, our interpretation is that the recent fall in the equity premium was en-
hanced by the shift toward expectational homogeneity. It was not the simple fact that
agents beliefs had turned pessimistic. Crucially, agents tend to agree on the perspective of
the market now, exactly as they previously disagreed. They are certainly pessimistic but,
more importantly, they agree in their pessimism, i.e. they are homogeneously pessimistic.
This homogeneity may have been a further reason to undercut, under the logic of our model,
the equity premium and so explain the empirical evidence we observe.
In assessing this interpretation, one should not forget two issues. First, this perspective
focuses only on the last decade, and can not be casually extrapolated. In general, we do
not claim that all the economic slowdowns are characterized by expectational homogeneity
and all the booms feature heterogeneity. We argued that this was the peculiarity of the
last ten years or so. Secondly, this reasoning does not disregard the classical risk motive
as a fundamental factor in determining asset pricing. It simply adds another explanatory
variable, namely heterogeneity of beliefs, in the interpretation of the temporal evolution
and amplitude of the equity premium. Further empirical research would be necessary when
better data about belief heterogeneity will become available.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Heterogeneity in beliefs emerges as a key factor to drive the equity premium. This discussion
does not analyze the fundamental economic question of how belief heterogeneity arises.
Assuming that belief heterogeneity exists in the real world, our focus is to study its eﬀects
on equilibrium asset pricing: how long does it last, how it interacts with wealth distribution
and propagate, what kind of transition it generates. These are the questions we have been
answered here.
The paper starts discussing, in an simpliﬁed framework, the direct implications of belief
heterogeneity over asset pricing. In this theoretical enquiry we point out some general
considerations. Firstly, belief heterogeneity plays a role, no matter how diﬀerent agents’
21expectations are. As far as they diﬀer by some amount an “heterogeneity premium” appears.
Even in a risk neutral economy such premia may be strictly positive. Naturally, the more
disparate are agents’ priors, the wider, in general, is the eﬀect. The actual number of agents
and risky assets in the economy is irrelevant for the sake of our qualitative results.
Secondly, our discussion provides a case against the representative agent framework26.I t
shows that the market interaction between “optimism” and “pessimism” - naturally hidden
in a representative agent framework - is crucial to deliver a link between wealth distribution
and equity premium. In section 4 we argue that, in line with the literature27 but adopting a
more general standpoint, anytime we want to use the representative agent paradigm, we have
to be aware that his risk aversion will incorporate a measure of belief heterogeneity in the
underlying multi agent economy. Therefore, it turns out that attaching to the representative
agent a degree of risk aversion arising from micro study in general biases the exercise.
Thirdly, and more technically, our discussion was quite general: introducing consump-
tion at t =0 , an inter-temporal discount factor, individual risk aversion and setting up
a fully dynamic model as the one presentes in section 5 does not contradict our initial
intuition. Belief heterogenity still remains a crucial factor to determine equilibrium asset
pricing and, in general, interacts with the distribution of wealth.
Fourthly, we propose a possible application of our arguments. We do not want to push
our interpretation of the premium’s temporal evolution too far and, in absence of further
empirical study, our point is not conclusive. It is nonetheless instructive and provides an
example of how our point of view could be put to work in interpreting the data: the ﬁnancial
market is a place that responds to technological innovation in particular and information in
general. Diﬀerent beliefs continuously confront each other in the ﬁnancial markets. Even if
agents update their assessments, it would be surprising if this updating delivered complete
homogeneity at any point in time. Thus the interaction between diﬀerent beliefs should be
studied: this paper does so and highlights that limited distributional issues may become
important when this interaction does not result in homeogeneous views.
Finally, a consideration about the general perspective in this work. One could argue that
the framework presented is unrealistic: the “big players” in ﬁnancial markets - the 10 % of
agents that have 95% of stocks in the US economy - tend to have homogeneous beliefs about
the future; they share information and are well informed. So they agree on the likelihood of
major events like the ones portrayed in our arguments. Moreover, even if they disagree, the
price would signal the heterogeneity in beliefs across agents and individuals would update
their probability assessment until some agreement is reached. This is basically the argument
that economic agents can not “agree to disagree”28. Since these people are the ones that
drive ﬁnancial markets - the argument says - the model is empirically irrelevant.
We can think about at least two reasons why this is not the case. The ﬁrst is that, as
26Constantinides [1982] seems at odds with our ﬁndings. It is probably worthy to notice that he points
out how heterogeneity in the endowment of zero net supply assets turns out to deliver an observationally
equivalent economy to the one with the representative agent. Notice that we assume heterogeneity in beliefs
and in the endowment of z, of which net supply is equal to one.
27Wang [1995], Berrada [2002], Dumas [1987], Guvenen [2002], Ziegler [2002] all recognize, sometimes in
diﬀerent frameworks, the importance of heterogeneous preferences.
28Milgrom and Stokey [1982].
22discussed in section 5, even major investors disagree. They just do not do it forever29.T h e
second is that we are not modelling the rationality of professional investors only but more
generally the investing attitude of individual savers. Therefore, one must be very careful
in interpreting our priors as objective probabilities and then considering the likelihood of
updating: in our model these are subjective probability assessments which, in the spirit
of Savage [1954], one can extract from agents’ choices. Since it does not seem unrealistic
to assume that diﬀerent people have diﬀerent preference orders, diﬀerent beliefs about the
future may easily emerge. Belief heterogeneity are thus derived by preference heterogeneity.
But if the individuals in the model - the stockholders in developed economies - face the choice
of investing in those mutual funds that hold most of their portfolio in stocks or those that
are bond based, belief heterogeneity cannot be ignored in the study of asset pricing.
7A p p e n d i x
This appendix reports the calculations behind the results in Section 3.2. Using the budget
constraint at t =0to express z as a function of b and equilibrium condition on the bond




















































































































































to the stock price (pZ). In order to apply the Implicit Function Theorem





only because there are two endogenous variables in it.
(19) and (18) deﬁne a system of equations that fully characterize the equilibrium of our
economy:
29Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982] proves that, if agents have diﬀerent information, they will agree



















is exogenous form the point




















: R2 × R −→ R2
Linearizing the system around its equilibrium and omitting the argument of Θ and
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is invertible. We will here appeal to the
regularity argument that almost all matrix have maximal rank. One should keep in mind that there could
be some values of the parameters for which the matrix is not invertible but these cases should be considered
an exception.
24which is clearly indeterminate. In order to draw conslusions about the linkage between
wealth and asset pricing in this framework we will assume:
(−)





























Moreover, to avoid considerations on the sign of the third derivative of utility, we as-
sume that Uccis negative and constant. Unfortunately it is hard to attach an economic
interpretation to the inequlities 21 and 22 but this is the price we have to pay if we want to
make distributional considerations in a strictly concave environment as general as possible.
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The signs of all the terms in 20 are determined below:
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25hence, since zLand zL
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0 “high”, i.e. zL
0 >z L
> 0 otherwise
and, keeping in mind that zLand zL
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Equity premium data are U.S. Research Returns Data, Fama-French Factors: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.ed
The data about heterogeneity in forecasts are taken by IBES database.
31I g n o r et h ec a s ea tw h i c hz
0
L = {0,1} because there is no trade at those initial endowments.
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